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By if.am Frazier, Deputy Sheriff, Grand Forks County (ND) Sheriff's Office, Associate Professor, University of North Dakota's Johm IIJ.
Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences

T

he Federal Aviation Administration's Aug. 29, 2016, enactment
of 14 CFR Part 107, The Small
UAS Rule, should provide public
safety agencies with assurance that the days
of frequent policy changes regarding small
unmanned aircraft systems are history. We
now have a set of regulations that are well
constructed and relatively easy to understand.
Rather than having to wait months for
an FAA certificate of authorization or waiver
(COA), public safety agencies can now get
sUAS programs into the air rapidly.
However, with this additional freedom
comes the heightened responsibility to
ensure well-constructed sUAS policies and
procedures are in place prior to operation.
Previously, FAA reviewed applicant agencies' UAS policies and procedures as part
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of the COA application process and/or onsite inspection. An agency operating under
14 CFR Part 107 will not undergo that FAA
scrutiny. Consequently, individual agencies
must commit to being their own overseers
and create policies that address, among
other topics, safety-related issues.

UAS Unit
Policy Documents
Largely in reaction to media coverage
regarding privacy, many agencies have
created UAS policies that address issues
such as who can authorize UAS operations,
when a search warrant is needed, how to
store UAS derived video and photographic
images, and how long such images are to
be reta ined. Unfortunately, these policies
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rarely adequately address day-to-day safety
related operational issues like weather limitations and crew initial and recurrent training and rest requirements.
Agencies wishing to establish UAS units
should ensure a unit policy is in place prior
to any UAS operations. The policy document should minimally describe the:
■

UAS unit chain-of-command.

■

Mission types authorized.

■

Image retention procedures.

■

Flight crew titles and responsibilities.

■

Initial and recurrent flight crew training requirements.

■

Minimum crew requirements (pilot
and visual observer).

UAS CORNER
down," during which UAS flight operations
are suspended and the spotlight is placed
on safety.

as heroes. If we fail, we are the subject of
constructive comments in NTSB reports.
The toughest answer to deliver is not
"Yes, I will accept the mission." It is "No,
we are not launching. The risks are too
high." It is important we all realize many of
the same pressures that result in poor
decision making by manned aircraft pilots
can also effect unmanned aircraft pilots. In
fact, one can argue the phenomenon of
undertaking excessive-risk missions may
be more prevalent in the unmanned
community because the UAS does not
have a crew aboard.
It is essential that UAS unit personnel
and law enforcement managers keep in
mind the following:

Safety Culture
Written policies are important, but even
more important is the establishment of a
pervasive unit culture that recognizes that
safety is mission one and that ensuring
safety involves many steps, including adherence to well thought-out written policies.
Unfortunately, a disturbing number of
National Transportation and Safety Board
public safety aircraft accident final reports
contain statements like, "The pilot exhibited
poor decision making when he chose to
takeoff," "There was evidence of management actions that emphasized accepting all
missions," and "self-induced pressure to
complete the mission was present."
From our earliest days in the police
academy, we are imbued with the mindset
that failure is not an option. This mindset,
combined with the inherent desire to help
others shared by the vast majority of officers, sets many law enforcement pilots up
for a dangerous decision making process.
If we take risks and succeed, we are hailed

0 Everything that goes up comes
down. Although a UAS accident
might not endanger the ground
crew, other persons or property
may be struck.

f) We are in the early phase of UAS
use by public satety agencies.
Opponents of the technology are
waiting to capitalize on incidents or
accidents to bolster their position.
All UAS operators owe it to their

Traffic

■

Flight time limitations and crew rest
requirements.

■

Weather limitations (maximum wind
velocities and minimum/maximum
air temperatures).

■

Pre- and post-flight inspection
requirements.

■

Maintenance discrepancy reporting
procedures.

■

Required mishap reporting procedures.

All UAS unit personnel, as well as supervisors and managers in the unit's chain of
command, should receive initial and recurrent training on the policies. The policies
should be periodically reviewed and revised
as the unit gains experience.
An ideal time to review safety policies
would be during an annual "safety stand-

HD-Video & Data Downlinks
■
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■ NEW CV4 Touchscreen Handheld Receiver
■

Livefeed IP Network Distribution Systems

■

Secure Encryption

■

Combined Receive Network Solutions (IP, Fiber, Coax)
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cially important in
the early stages of
UAS use. During this
learning period,
many flight risks will
not be readily recognizable. A wellconstructed FRAT
provides opportunities to assess the
perceived risk of
numerous variables,
such as wind velocity, outside air
' temperature, visibility
and cloud ceiling,
crew experience and
mission familiarity.
■ An anonymous
safety reporting system accessible
by anyone. The system should
permit safety reports to be delivered to the agency head or his/
her delegate while maintaining
the confidentiality of the
reporting person.

fellow agencies to avoid incidents
that could result in adverse publicity.

8 A major accident deprives the
agency of UAS use, taking an
important tool away from
the agency.

Don't Reinvent
The Wheel
Borrowing from well-established manned
air support safety programs can greatly
assist UAS units in establishing a sound
program. Time-tested procedures include:
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■

Pre- and post-mission briefs in
which all participants have an equal
voice. Keep in mind that all of us
are smarter than any one of us.

■

Flight dispatching by an uninvolved,
knowledgeable individual who is not
on-scene. In order for a UAS flight
to launch, both the pilot and
dispatcher must concur the flight
can be conducted safely and within
policy. Do not think of a communications dispatcher, but rather an
aviation sawy department member
who does not have a dog in the
fight. They are likely to be more
objective than on-scene personnel.

■

Thorough pre- and post-flight
inspections to ensure airworthiness
and identify discrepancies at the
conclusion of a mission. A maintenance discrepancy records system
should be implemented. It is also
prudent to maintain a maintenance
logbook for each sUAS.

■

Use of a flight risk assessment tool
(FRAT) to assist crews in recognizing
and mitigating risk. FRATs are espe-
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■

A non-punitive environment that
views non-intentional safety
breaches as opportunities for
education. These situations should
not require punishment.

■

Regular realistic scenario-based
training. "We don't rise to the level
of our expectations, we fall to the
level of our training." This statement
is as true today as when it was written by Archilochus in the sixth
century B.C. UAS unit personnel
must train at least quarterly-and
preferably monthly-to maintain the
required knowledge, skills and abilities to safely operate their UAS.
After unit personnel achieve
adequate aircraft operating skills,
the majority of subsequent training
should be scenario based and as
realistic as possible. Use role players and rotate responsibility for
organizing the training scenarios
among unit members so everyone
gets the benefit of handling unknown
scenarios and setting up training.
Avoid statements such as, "In a real
situation, we would have ... " Handle
each training scenario as if it were
actually happening. Only through this
type of realism will your team
achieve the requisite level of confidence and competency to safely
deploy UAS.

Joint Operations with
Manned Aircraft
Prior to October 2016, the Northeast
Region UAS Unit had conducted only a
handful of missions in which manned
aircraft were also involved. However, during
that month and into November, while assisting with the law enforcement response to
the Dakota Access Pipeline protests near
Cannonball, ND, the unit conducted more
than 100 flight hours and 75 missions in
close proximity to other law enforcement
aircraft, including airplanes and helicopters.
These missions were all completed safely
through close cooperation among all aircraft
pilots. Procedures were established to provide
vertical and, in some cases, horizontal separation. Each aircraft agreed to remain within a
specific vertical block of airspace with no less
than a 100-foot buffer. Initial coordination was
done via telephone, with on-scene coordination
performed via two-way radio communications
on a pre-designated VHF aviation frequency.
Occasionally, additional separation was
ensured by participating pilots agreeing to
remain east or west of a major highway that
traversed the primary protest area.
Through mutual respect and professionalism, pilots of both manned and
unmanned aircraft were able to safely
complete their missions.
An additional concern was the presence
of at least two sUAS being operated by
protestors and a protestor launching arrows
at a contract helicopter. The unmanned
aircraft repeatedly overflew law enforcement
officers at a low level and came within
dangerous proximity of helicopters working
with law enforcement.
An initial request to FAA for a temporary
flight restriction (TFR) was denied because
"arrows can't travel more than 100 feet, and
the TFR would not stop protestors from flying
their drones." It takes very little research to
determine that arrows launched from
compound bows can be accurate to a range
exceeding 900 feet. In addition, no TFR ever
prevents anyone from flying within the area. It
is a respect for safety and the threat of
subsequent FAA administrative action that
keeps unauthorized aircraft out of TFR areas.
Only after a U.S. senator from North Dakota
intervened was the TFR granted.
It is worth repeating that the overarching
goal of any UAS program should be the
creation of a pervasive safety oriented
culture where everyone places safety first.
Development of sound policies and procedures will be for naught if such a safety
culture is not established and nurtured.~

